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COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EDITORs NoTE.-It is intended in each issue of DIC-A to print brief abstracts
of the decisions of the Supreme Court. These abstracts will be printed only after the
time within which a petition for rehearing may be filed has elapsed without such action being taken, or in the event that a petition for rehearing has been filed the abstract
will be printed only after the petition has been disposed of.)

ATTACHMENT-LIABILITY OF GARNISHEE-No. 12246-City
of Denver, garnishee, vs. Jones. Decided February4, 1929.
Facts-Mary E. Jones, judgment creditor of the defendant Morris, an employee of the garnishee the City and County
of Denver, attacks the validity of assignments of wages on, the
ground that they violate Section 5110 of the Compiled Laws
of 1921. After the service of garnishment the garnishee paid
the money to the assignee. The testimony showed that the
assignment was ,primarily for the benefit of the assignor and
certain of his creditors.
Held.-That the applicability of the statute to the transactions herein involved depends upon the definition or explanation of things in action set forth in the statute. The
debtor was employed by the garnishee, and wages to be earned
are things in action within the contemplation of the statute
and could be assigned and when assigned would be subject to
the statute here invoked. For that reason the assignments
were void. The contention that the city could not be liable
to the garnishor unless liable to the defendant is subject to an
exception, and only where there is no fraud or the transaction
infringes no established legal principle is the above rule true.
In the instant case the assignment, being primarily for the
benefit of the assignor, under the statute is void.
Judgment Affirmed.
CITATION TO PROBATE-WAIVER-EFFECT-No.

12066-Wil-

son and Wolfe vs. Van Zant, et al--Decided February 18,
1929.
Facts.-Thomas Wolfe died testate. A citation was issued for probate hearing on March 14, 1927, and on that day,
the citation was filed bearing a waiver of notice and consent
to probate, signed by plaintiffs in error, who were plaintiffs
below. On the same day, Richard Wolfe filed a caveat and
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on March 21 he filed a revocation of his waiver and consent
to probate. On March 28 Kate Wilson filed her revocation
of waiver. The County Court granted this, but refused
Wolfe's and struck his caveat. The demand of both plaintiffs
for a jury was refused and the will was probated.
Held.-The so-called "waivers" did not bar plaintiffs
from contesting the will, because the position of none of the
other parties had been changed, and there was, therefore, no
estoppel. Plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial.
Judgement Reversed.
CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT-CHANGE OF BY-LAWS--EsTOPPEL IN

PAl--No. 12028-Farmers Life Insurance Com-

pany vs. Hetherington-DecidedFebruary18, 1929.
Facts.-Hetherington brought this action against the Insurance Company to recover damages for alleged breach of
contract, He was chosen the Company's general counsel
March 5, 1926, and discharged in November, 1926. Prior to
March 5, 1925, the general counsel had been an officer of the
company, holding office for one year, but this office was abolished on that date and the counsel's employment was at the
will of the Board of Directors. In his complaint, Hetherington alleged his employment under the by-law providing for
one year's tenure of office. The answer set forth the change
of March 5, 1925, to which Hetherington filed a replication
claiming that the company was estopped to set up this change,
because the secretary had told Hetherington, in February,
1926, that the original by-law on this point had not been
changed so far as he knew.
Held.-The trial court should not have permitted the case
to go to the jury because the estoppel was not proved. Hetherington had access to the minutes and should not have relied
on the secretary's qualified statement.
Judgment Reversed and Case Remanded.
HANDS"-COSTS--No. 12270-Nolan vs.
Lantz Sanitary Laundry Company-Decided February 11,
1929.
Facts.-Nolan entered the Laundry's employ and signed

EQUITY-"CLEAN
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a contract providing that either party should give two weeks'
notice of the termination of the employment, and that the employee should not enter the business of collecting or soliciting
laundry work for a period of six months after leaving the
Company's employ. The Company discharged Nolan, paying him two weeks' advance wages, which he accepted.
Thereafter, and within six months, he solicited laundry work.
This action was brought to enjoin this violation of the contract.
He filed a cross complaint for $41.27, which the Company
admitted was due and paid into the registry of the Court. No
costs were allowed.
Held.-The receipt by Nolan of advance wages constituted a waiver of any failure by the Company to comply with
the contract. Lower court's ruling on costs was within its
jurisdiction.
Judgment Affirmed.
IRRIGATION DISTRICTS-ASSESSMENTS--No. 11991-San Luis

Valley Irrigation District vs. Noffsinger-Decided February 4, 1929.
Facts.-Noffsinger,-alleging that the district had over his
protest constructed a drainage ditch across his land and in so
doing seized or destroyed portions of his property, brought
this action. The defendant in the court below was an irrigation district. Portions of the land included therein had gone
to seep. It proposed and actually constructed a drainage
ditch, which bisected the plaintiff's land. By reason of the
proximity of the plaintiff's land to the ditch his land -was
completely drained, and he was one of the chief beneficiaries
of the drainage ditch. The plaintiff paid the assessments generally made against all land within the district for the purpose
of said district.
Held.-That the special damages sustained by the plaintiff through the taking of his land were offset by the special
benefits he received in having his land completely drained,
and that the instruction to the effect that benefits to land not
taken should be offset against damages thereto should have
been given by the lower court.
Judgment Reversed.
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MECHANICS'

LIENS-FILING

OF

CONTRACT

BY

OWNER-

WAIVER OF LIEN-No. 12053-Armour and Company vs.

McPhee and McGinnity-Decided February 18, 1929.
Facts.-Defendants in error, plaintiffs below, furnished
labor and material for the erection of a building for defendant, for the construction of which one Sullivan was principal
contractor. The bills of the various sub-contractors were not
paid and they brought this action to foreclose their various
liens. The defendant maintains that the lien under the Colorado statute is derivative and not independent.
Defendant recorded this contract with Sullivan, which
refers to certain plans and drawings, but these were not attached. Defendant also claims that a waiver was executed by
Sullivan, purporting to release any claims for liens which he
or any sub-contractor might have against the owner, and that
the Colorado statutory provision invalidating such waivers is
unconstitutional. As to the plaintiff, Midwest Steel and Iron
Works Company, defendant asserts that the fact that its corporate charter had expired destroys its right to maintain this
action in its corporate name.
Held.-It is immaterial whether the lien is derivative or
independent because the paper -recorded by defendant is insufficient in that the plans are not included. All the work and
labor are, therefore, deemed to have been done at the instance
of the owner and it is unnecessary to decide the constitutionality of the statute regarding the waivers. The contract with
Midwest Steel and Iron Works Company was made during
the corporate life of this company and after the expiration of
the charter the contractors, either in the name of the company
or as trustees, may maintain this action.
Judgment Affirmed.
PROMISSORY NOTE-DEFENSE-PLEADINc---No. 11993-Riel

and Riel vs. Schwalb and Cannon-Decided February 18,
1929.
Facts.-Schwalb and Cannon sued Riel and Riel on a
promissory note.

Defendants' answer alleged that they had

given their note for $2,000.00 to The Home Savings and Merchants Bank long before July 13, 1925; that on July 6, 1925,
this bank consolidated with The Globe National Bank, through
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fraud and deceit; that plaintiffs were directors of The Home
Savings and Merchants Bank and knew of all the fraud practiced in the merger and in dealing with their notes; that about
July 6, 1925, the Home Savings Bank and Merchants Bank
sold the $2,000.00 note to another bank; that on July 13, 1925,
defendants executed a renewal note (the one now in question)
on the Globe Bank's representation that it held the old note;
that the merged banks failed on September 19, 1925; that defendants had money on deposit in the Globe Bank sufficient
to pay this note, on which they received dividends of $700.00,
which they have offered to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs took this
note without consideration, after maturity, and with full
knowledge of its infirmities. The trial court sustained a demurrer to this answer.
Held.-The answer states a good defense.
Judgment Reversed with Directions to Overrule the Demurrer.
12045
-Slife vs. Credit Finance Corporation-DecidedFebruary
11, 1929.
Facts.-The Corporation sued Slife on a note for $500.00,
dated January 16, 1926, payable $50.00 per month beginning
February 16, 1926, with interest at 1% per month after maturity, and providing for 15% attorney's fees. Fifty dollars
was deducted from principal as the first ten months' interest.
Default was made February 16, 1926, and this matured the
note. Lower Court allowed 1% per month from that date,
together with attorney's fees.
Held.-The $50.00 deducted in advance paid the interest
until November 16, 1926, and additional allowance of interest
was error.
Judgment Modified and Affirmed.
PROMISSORY NOTE-INTEREST-ATTORNEY'S FEEs--No.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-PRACTICE-No.

12236-Colo-

rado Fuel & Iron Co. vs. Industrial Commission-Decided
February 4, 1929.
Facts.-Various hearings were held before the referee,
and the matter was continued from time to time for the purpose of determining the compensation, if any, due the claim-
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ant. The Commission finally ordered that compensation be denied. Nothing further was done in the case for some time until
a letter was written to the Commission in behalf of the claimant calling attention to an alleged injustice done the claimant
and asking that the case be re-opened. The Commission
caused notice to be served upon the claimant and the company
that a further hearing would be had. The company objected
on the ground that there had been a final order entered, and
that no petition for review was filed, and there was no reason
assigned by the commission for re-opening of the case. Nevertheless the hearing proceeded and an award was made. The
company filed its petition to review and the former award was
affirmed. Thereupon the Company commenced this action in
the District Court.
Held.-That under Section 4484 of the Compiled Laws
of 1921 the Commission on its own motion on the ground of
error or a change in conditions may re-open the case, and it
is not required that the commission set forth in its order in
reopening the case any cause or reason therefor. To reverse
this case would require that it be sent back to the Commission
for further proceedings, and as substantial justice was finally
done by the commission after the re-opening of the case it
would be useless to return the case to it. There was sufficient
evidence upon which the Commission could have found that
the claimant was entitled to the award.
Judgment Affirmed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-REFEREE'S FINDING OF FACT-

No. 12112-Industrial Commission and Colorado Fuel &
Iron Co. vs. Robinson-DecidedFebruary18, 1929.
Facts.-Robinson filed a workman's notice of claim for
compensation in 1921, and alleged that he accidentally sustained injuries, arising out of and in the course of his employment by the Company. After a long series of hearings the
Referee of the Industrial Commission found as a fact that
Robinson's disability was caused by sciatica, and entered an
award in favor of the Company. The District Court reversed
this ruling.
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Held.-There is a little evidence to support the referee's
finding of fact, and it was, therefore, error for the District
Court to reverse the award.
Judgment Reversed.

RECENT TRIAL COURT DECISIONS
(EDToR's NoTE.-It is intended in each issue of Dicta to note any interestinj decisions of the United States District Court, the Denver District Court, the County
Court, the Juvenile Court, and occasionally the Justice Courts.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT-No.

7858-UnitedStates v.

Broadmoor Hotel Company-J. Foster Symes, Judge.
Facts.-Defendant, at its hotel, gives tea dances which
are open to the public as well as guests. A table d'hote charge
of seventy-five cents is made for tea, which is the uniform
charge throughout the hotel, whether music and dancing are
available or not. Those attending may occupy chairs and
tables but are under no obligation to order refreshments, nor
is there any cover or entrance charge.
The Government alleges the tax prescribed by Sec.
800(a), Subdiv. 6 of the Rev. Act of 1918, approved February 24, 1919, and Sec. 800(a), Subdiv. 5 of the Rev. Act of
1921* is applicable to these facts, and seeks to recover the
tax and penalties for the years 1919 to 1924 inclusive.
Held.-The language of the sections in question imports
something more than the furnishing by the hotel of agreeable surroundings and music by an orchestra, and it is contemplated that the entertainment be conducted for profit and
admission charged. Here the charge of seventy-five cents is
not an excessive one for the tea, and there is no direct profit.
The Sections call for something that might be termed
entertainment, as distinguished from the mere service of food
in the manner and with the accessories customary and expected
by patrons of a hotel of the character of that of defendants.
*These sections are identical and read as follows: "A tax of II2 cents for
each ten cents or fraction thereof of the amount paid for admission to any public
performance for profit at any roof garden, cabaret, or other similar entertainment, to
which the charge for admission is wholly or in part included in the price paid for
refreshment, service or merchandise; the amount paid for such admission to be
deemed to be 20 per centum of the amount paid for refreshment, service and merchandise; such tax to be paid by the person paying for such refreshment, service or
merchandise."
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The term "cabaret" denotes something more in the way of
entertainment than is found in this situation; here no professional dancers or actors were hired by the hotel, and the music
did not include soloists, either instrumental or vocal.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT-No. 5 9 8 5 -In the Matter
of The Colorado Farms Company, Bankrupt-J. Foster
Symes, Judge.
Facts.-On June 30th, 1928, the Referee in Bankruptcy
ordered the sale of 278 parcels of farm lands owned by the
bankrupt to be sold free and clear of all liens and encumbrances, the liens of encumbrancers to attach to the proceeds
to be realized from the sale. The sale was held August 2nd,
and on August 14th an order was entered by the Referee approving the sale of certain of the parcels. Subsequently The
International Trust Company, Trustee, and The Colorado
National Bank, Trustee, each filed petitions for the application of the proceeds of the sales of the real estate in which
they were respectively interested, asking among other things
that the fees of the Trustee and Referee in Bankruptcy,
amounting to a total of 2% of the sale proceeds, be found not
to be a charge against the sale proceeds, but a charge against
the general estate of the bankrupt. The Referee disqualified
himself to hear the petitions insofar- as the fee question was
involved, and referred the question to the Judge of the District Court for decision.
Held.-That the fees and commissions of the Referee and
Trustee in Bankruptcy in connection with the sales mentioned
in the petitions could not be charged against the proceeds of
these sales. The Court did not decide whether these fees
should be a charge against the general estate of the bankrupt.
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended in 1903, provided:
Trustees shall receive for their services, payable after they are rendered,
from estates which they have administered such commissions on all
moneys disbursed by them as may be allowed by the courts, not to exceed six
per centum on the first five hundred dollars or less, * * * and one per centum
on moneys in excess of ten thousand dollars.
*

*

*
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This was changed in 1910 to read:
Trustees shall receive for their services, payable after they are rendered,
* •such commissions on all moneys disbursed or turned over to any person,
including lienholders, by them, as may be allowed by the courts, etc.

The commissions allowed to referees are the same as the
commissions allowed to trustees in bankruptcy.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit, in In
re Harralson,179 Fed. 490, construing the Bankruptcy Act as
amended in 1903, held that under no circumstances was the
trustee or referee entitled to commissions to be paid from the
proceeds of the sale of encumbered assets, on the theory that
the sale is for the benefit, not of the lienholder, but of the
general estate, and that therefore these commissions should be
paid out of the general estate.
It was decided by the District Court in the present case
that the 1910 amendment, adding the words "or turned over
to any person, including lienholders," did not change the
source of payment of the trustee's and referee's commissions,
but concerned only the amount of the commissions.
100,864-Colorado NationalBank v. Rehbein et al-JudgeHenry Bray.
Facts.-Rehbein, on December 28, 1923, signed a note for
$3,000, payable to Louis Siener in three years and secured by
deed of trust on certain property. Siener pledged the note
with the bank as collateral for a loan of $3,000 to himself. A
few months later Fred Giggals and Edith Giggals bought the
property above from Mrs. Rehbein, the Giggals assuming the
payment of the note and deed of trust. On December 28,
1926, the date of maturity, the Giggals, wishing to pay off the
note, gave a deed of trust for $3,000 to the Capitol Life Insurance Company, which $3,000 was paid to Louis A. Siener, who
gave a forged copy of the note therefor, and also a request for
the release of the deed of trust. This release was executed by
the Public Trustee. The release, and the mortgage to the
Capitol Life Insurance Company, were recorded on the same
day, but the release was by inadvertence recorded five minutes
after the mortgage. On the same day, namely, the date of
maturity, Siener told the bank that the note had been extended
and, with their consent, wrote an extension on the back of the
DENVER DISTRICT COURT-DIVISION 4, No.
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note. He had previously endorsed the interest payments as
each became due. Over a year later Siener was arrested for
other crimes and the situation was disclosed. The bank
brought an action to foreclose and for the amount of the note,
against Rehbein, the Giggals and the Insurance Company.
The chief defenses were as follows:
(1) The bank was negligent in allowing Siener to collect interest, endorse payments, extend the note, and endorse
the extension, without the bank notifying the maker that
Siener was no longer holder or inquiring whether the note was
really extended.
(2)
The bank, by the above omissions, was estopped
from denying Siener's agency to collect the principal.
(3)
The note was avoided by a material alteration made
with the bank's consent and without the assent of the maker.
(4) The Capitol Life Insurance Company claimed
that they were purchasers relying upon the release of the deed
of trust by the Public Trustee.
Held.-Judgment in favor of defendants on all points,
particularly on the ground of the bank's negligence.
The Court considered that, although none of the parties
had committed any wrong, the plaintiff bank had placed its
confidence in Siener throughout, whereas the defendants, and
particularly the Giggals, who bought the property and made
payments of interest and were personally present when Siener
received the principal, were not careless or negligent and
should not suffer loss, and that it would be inequitable to set
aside the release obtained by reason of the payment to Siener.
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